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ESSAY

PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION, ADJUDICATIVE
JURISDICTION, AND THE MINISTERIAL
EXEMPTION

HOWARD M. WASSERMAN

†

INTRODUCTION
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court decided the first significant case of the October 2011 Term, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu1
theran Church and School v. EEOC. A unanimous Court held that a
“called” teacher (a commissioned Lutheran minister) teaching secular subjects from a Christ-centered perspective could not prevail in
an action challenging her termination under the Americans with
2
Disabilities Act (ADA).
The Court for the first time recognized the “ministerial exemption”
3
to the ADA and other federal employment discrimination laws, af-

†

Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Different iterations of this paper were
presented at the 2009 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, at PrawfsFest in
July 2010, and at a faculty workshop at the University of Richmond School of Law in
September 2011. My thanks to all the participants in those programs for their comments. Special thanks to Chris Lund and Kevin Walsh for comments and suggestions
on the current version.
1
80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (2012).
2
Id. at 4057-58, 4061-63; see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial
Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 61-64 (2011) (describing the factual and procedural
background of the case).
3
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061.

(289)
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4

firming the uniform position of the federal courts of appeals. The
exemption provides that, under the First Amendment, federal employment discrimination law does not apply to claims concerning the
employment relationship between religious institutions and their min5
isterial employees. Lower courts had defined ministerial employees
6
7
broadly to include not only the heads of religious organizations. Instead, the exemption had been held also to cover anyone responsible
8
for religious doctrine, teaching, and administration, including clergy,
9
religion, theology, and canon law scholars and teachers, pastoral
10
11
12
counselors, ministerial administrators, lay administrators, and even
13
organists and choir leaders.
The exemption is justified as preventing constitutionally problematic second-guessing on ecclesiastical matters, thereby avoiding interference with the relationships between religious organizations and
those who teach, speak, and minister on ecclesiastical and theological
14
matters. The exception also prevents secular courts from ordering a
4

See id. & n.2. Several circuits had addressed the issue. See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2010); Rweyemamu v.
Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472,
474-75 (7th Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-07 (3d Cir. 2006).
5
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the
Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1975-76 (2007) [hereinafter Corbin, Above the Law?]; Caroline Mala
Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 106
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 96, 97 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2011/22/LRColl2011n22Corbin.pdf [hereinafter Corbin, Irony];
Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156, 15859 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/27/LRColl2011
n27Horwitz.pdf [hereinafter Horwitz, Act III]; Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 118-22 (2009) [hereinafter Horwitz, Institutions]; Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment
Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the
Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 43, 48-49 (2008); Lund, supra note 2, at 21-23.
6
See Corbin, Above the Law?, supra note 5, at 1976-77.
7
See Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061.
8
See Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 200; Petruska, 462 F.3d at 304; McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir. 1972).
9
See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
10
See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 224-25 (6th Cir. 2007).
11
See Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1997).
12
See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240
(10th Cir. 2010).
13
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006).
14
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W.
4056, 4063 (2012) (“The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and
control who will minister to the faithful . . . is the church’s alone.”); id. at 4061 (de-
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church to hire someone into a ministerial position or to pay someone whom it does not wish to hire or employ, typical remedies in
15
Such a judicial order invades
employment discrimination cases.
religious organizations’ core mission of educating and forming their
members, which depends on their ability to select those who minister
16
and teach religious doctrine.
The ministerial exemption is a specific application of the broader
freedom of the church doctrine—also styled as the church autonomy
doctrine—which recognizes the constitutional liberty of religious organizations to manage their institutions and limits the reach of secular
17
or civil authority into their internal workings. Church autonomy rescribing the right of churches to control “selection of those who will personify its beliefs”); see also Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy, Then and
Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1612 (arguing that government nonentanglement with
religious groups includes leaving them the freedom to “organize themselves, define
their mission, and choose their workers”); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom,
Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. R EV. COLLOQUY
175, 175 (2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/28/
LRColl2011n28Garnett.pdf (“The ‘ministerial exception’ . . . is a clear and crucial implication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the separation of church and state
. . . .”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 154 (2009)
(“[T]he ministerial exception limits the power of the state to specify the content of the
clerical office or the terms of the relationship between cleric and congregation.”).
15
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061.
16
See id. at 4064 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the First Amendment protects
“certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship services and other
religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of communicating the
faith”); Berg et al., supra note 14, at 176 (“[The exemption] protects the fundamental
freedom of religious communities to educate their members and form them spiritually
and morally.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 120 (arguing that religious liberty protects churches’ choice of leaders).
17
See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (describing the
freedom “to select the clergy” as emanating from “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation”); Skrzypczak, 611
F.3d at 1242 n.4 (“Th[e] church autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and
polity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002))); see also Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1998)
(“[T]he autonomy of the [religious] group is nonetheless protected [by the Establishment Clause] from interference by whatever value preferences that modern society
seeks to impose . . . .”); Richard W. Garnett, “Things That Are Not Caesar’s”: The Story of
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (arguing that church autonomy commands the ministerial exemption), in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 171, 187-89 (Richard W. Garnett &
Andrew Koppelman eds., 2011); Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, Church Autonomy,
and the Structure of Freedom [hereinafter Garnett, Religious Liberty] (“[T]he Constitution
guarantees religious freedom not only to individual believers but also to the Church as
an organized society with its own law and jurisdiction.” (internal quotations marks
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quires that secular authority keep its “hands off” matters of faith, religious doctrine, theological pronouncements, the structure and internal governance of religious institutions, and other matters of the
18
spiritual domain. The doctrine previously manifested itself in a series
of Supreme Court decisions involving disputes over church property.
As the Court recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, these cases confirm that
there are limits on the government’s power to interfere with a
19
church’s determination of who can minister.
The church autonomy doctrine’s limitations on state authority ensure a structural balance separating church and state as competing
sovereigns within American society, each with irreducible authority in
20
its own “sphere.” The First Amendment ensures the “penultimacy of
the state,” and the ultimacy of the church, in those areas in which the
21
church must predominate, as well as the converse in those areas in

omitted)), in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 271 ( J ohn Witte,
Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981) (arguing that “churches have a constitutionally protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference”);
Lund, supra note 2, at 10 (“The ministerial exception arises from the conflict between
employment laws and constitutional principles of church autonomy.”); Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 14, at 120 (arguing that the First Amendment protects control over internal
affairs of religious organizations).
18
See Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061 (describing church control over “internal
governance” as a means of “protect[ing] a religious group’s right to shape its own faith
and mission”); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are
We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 854 (2009) [hereinafter, Garnett,
Hands-Off] (“The hands-off rule, then, is . . . a rule that state actors should not render
religious decisions . . . .”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts
Over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“[S]ecular courts must not
determine questions of religious doctrine and practice.”); Lund, supra note 2, at 12
(“By requiring the government to stay out of religious affairs, the Constitution commits
matters of religious belief and practice exclusively to the private sphere.”); see also
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating the general rule that
courts cannot interfere with religious organizations’ choices about clergy).
19
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4059-60.
20
See Garnett, Hands-Off, supra note 18, at 849 (describing the constitutional mandate that secular and religious authorities “‘not interfere with each other’s respective
spheres of choice and influence’” (quoting EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
916-21 (2d ed. 2005))); Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 161 (“[C]ourts, and the state
itself, are simply not authorized to intervene in life at the heart of churches.”); Horwitz,
Institutions, supra note 5, at 83, 107-08 (applying the theory of “sphere sovereignty” to
the ministerial exception); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (arguing that the religion clauses “limit[] government to the secular and temporal, and foreclos[e] government from exercising authority over the spiritual domain”).
21
Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 91.
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22

which the state should predominate. It reflects the injunction to
“render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s, and unto God the
23
things that are God’s.”
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the courts of appeals uniformly recognized
24
some form of ministerial exemption. Even the EEOC and the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor acknowledged that the First Amendment prohibited the core case of federal law requiring ordination of women by the
25
Catholic Church or by an Orthodox Jewish seminary. The divide was
over the exemption’s scope beyond that core—how to define minister,
and whether the exemption should extend beyond those who perform
core, basic religious functions to actors on the periphery, such as lay
26
teachers. While the Supreme Court recognized the exemption, it
declined to adopt a “rigid” formula for defining a minister, leaving
harder questions for another day and concluding simply that the
teacher in this case did qualify, based on her title, religious training,
27
self-identification, and job functions.
A second open issue surrounded the ministerial exemption prior to
Hosanna-Tabor: its proper jurisdictional characterization. Is the exemption a jurisdictional limitation or an aspect of the merits of a
claim? Does it reflect a First Amendment limitation on the reach of
substantive secular law into matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance? Or does it limit the adjudicative jurisdiction of the courts in
which such disputes might be resolved? Put differently, if and when
the ministerial exemption defeats a claim in federal court, does the
claim fail because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or because the plaintiff’s claim fails on the merits?
Lower courts divided on this issue along multiple, confusing, and
often incoherent lines. Some circuits treated it as a question of the
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, resolvable on a Rule 12(b)(1)
28
29
motion. Other circuits treated it as a merits issue. Still other cir22

See Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 161 (“This allocation of authority is not intended to signal the primacy of churches or the inferiority of the state. It is a doublesided settlement . . . .”).
23
Matthew 22:21.
24
See supra text accompanying note 4.
25
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W.
4056, 4061 (2012).
26
See Lund, supra note 2, at 64-65. Compare Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 163-64
& nn.34-36, with Corbin, Irony, supra note 5, at 103-06.
27
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061-63.
28
See, e.g., McCants v. Alabama-West Fla. Conf. of the United Methodist Church,
Inc., No. 09-13316, 2010 WL 1267160, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-
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cuits had not taken an explicit position, simply taking cases as the dis30
trict court characterized them, whether as merits determinations,
31
32
jurisdictional dismissals, or without characterization. And one cir33
cuit actually had contradictory panel decisions. The few scholars to
engage the question had argued that it was a limit on the jurisdiction
34
35
of the court, or at least described it with jurisdictional rhetoric.
The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the characterization question, nor did the issue arise during oral argument. Nevertheless, the Court noted and resolved the conflict in short order in a
footnote, stating:
[T]he exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable
claim, not a jurisdictional bar. This is because the issue presented by the exception is “whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,”
not whether the court has “power to hear [the] case.” . . . District courts have
power to consider ADA claims in cases of this sort, and to decide whether the
36
claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”

Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 775-76 (6th Cir. 2010); Tomic
v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006); Combs v. Cent. Tex.
Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1999).
29
See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1242
(10th Cir. 2010); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2006); Werft
v. Desert Sw. Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203
F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d
1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 478 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“The fact that enforcement of the [Fair Labor Standards Act] in a particular case would entangle the court in an ecclesiastical controversy would be a compelling reason to dismiss that case, but not a reason founded on a lack of jurisdiction
over a plaintiff's claim . . . .”).
30
See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360,
361-62 (8th Cir. 1991).
31
See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2008).
32
See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
33
Compare Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328, 329 (4th Cir.
1997) (affirming jurisdictional dismissal), with Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of SeventhDay Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming merits dismissal
based on statutory interpretation).
34
See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 81 (arguing that the requirement that courts decline review of ministerial employment cases “seems to be another way of saying that
the Constitution removes . . . the subject-matter jurisdiction”).
35
See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44 (“It is helpful to envision the scope of this jurisdictional bar as a sphere within which the Supreme Court has stated that churches may
operate free of civil constraints.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (“[T]he Religion
Clauses are primarily jurisdictional . . . .”); id. at 146 (arguing that courts should not be
“vest[ed] with jurisdiction to decide on the quality of a minister’s job performance”).
36
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056,
4063 n.4 (2012) (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
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In doing so, the Roberts Court continued its recent jurisprudential
project of correcting “profligate” and “less than meticulous” use of the
word jurisdiction in the lower courts, while signaling to lower courts
the need to avoid issuing jurisdictional rulings that are not, upon
37
fuller analysis, truly jurisdictional. It also marked the second time in
recent years that the Court resolved a circuit split on a jurisdiction/merits issue in passing in a case in which jurisdictionality was not
directly in play. Two terms ago, the Court made a two-page detour to
pronounce the merits character of the extraterritoriality of federal secu38
rities fraud statutes. This time, the Court did it in a footnote.
Hosanna-Tabor correctly characterized the ministerial exemption as
a limitation on the merits of the employment discrimination claim. I
39
repeatedly argued for this position before the Court entered the mix,
including in this Essay, which was written and accepted for publication
in October 2011 (before the Court discovered unanimity and thus was
able to decide the case fairly quickly). But the Court’s jurisdictionality
footnote was entirely conclusory, failing to explain why the issue controls whether the plaintiff’s allegations entitle him to relief rather than
whether the court has power to hear the case.
It thus remains to unpack why the exemption is, in fact, a merits
doctrine. First, doing so demonstrates the correctness of the conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor, putting to rest any normative dispute on the
issue. Second, mischaracterization of the ministerial exemption resulted from the same category errors that plague characterization of
other legal issues; this issue illustrates nicely the routine conflation of
jurisdiction and merits and courts’ failure to maintain clean lines be40
tween doctrines and underlying concepts. While the Court’s conclu37

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006); see also Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-by Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 947-48 (2011)
[hereinafter Wasserman, Drive-by]; Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil
Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 311, 315-16 (2012) [hereinafter Wasserman, Revival].
38
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77.
39
See Howard Wasserman, Characterizing the Ministerial Exemption, Again,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 4, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/
characterizing-the-ministerial-exemption-again.html; Howard Wasserman, Tenth Circuit
Gets Ministerial Exemption Right, Appellate Procedure Wrong, PRAWFSBLAWG ( J uly 20, 2010),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/07/tenth-circuit-gets-ministerialexemption-right-appellate-procedure-wrong.html [hereinafter Wasserman, Tenth Circuit].
40
See generally Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on
a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227 (2008) [hereinafter Wasserman, NonExtant Rights]; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 579 (2007); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643
(2005) [hereinafter, Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits].
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sion that the exemption is merits-based might be enough to signal
lower courts on future jurisdictionality issues, actual analysis and explanation may better enable them to understand and recognize the
limits of what goes to jurisdiction and, inversely, the breadth of what
goes to substantive merits.
This Essay, I hope, provides that analysis.
I. JURISDICTION AND DISABILITIES
The Hosanna-Tabor Court reached the correct conclusion about the
jurisdictionality of the ministerial exemption: it is a constitutional affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable employment discrimina41
tion claim that defeats the claim on the merits. But the Court did
not provide the normative foundation for that conclusion, which is
what this Part sets out to do.
Our starting point must be to define “merits,” which we can do
in any of four ways.
The first definition asks whether a provision of federal law
“reaches” the defendant’s conduct, meaning it “prohibits” that con42
duct. As I have argued previously, the “same idea may be framed as
whether the statute applies to, binds, legally constrains, or controls
43
some actor or conduct.”
Second, and relatedly, we could ask whether the creator of a legal
rule—most notably Congress—has “asserted regulatory power over the
44
challenged conduct.” This could ask either whether the legislature did
assert regulatory power over some actors or conduct, or whether it constitutionally could assert regulatory power over those actors or conduct.
Third, we could say that merits issues dictate “who is entitled to sue
45
whom, for what, and for what remedy.” A plaintiff prevails on her
claim when applicable law permits her to sue this defendant for this
conduct and entitles her to this remedy; she fails on her claim if applicable law does not permit suit against this defendant for this conduct or for this remedy.

41

Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061, 4063 n.4.
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
43
Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 950.
44
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45
John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998); see also Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236
(“The substantive merits of a legal claim of right focus on who can sue whom over what
real-world conduct and for what remedy under applicable law.”).
42
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Finally, we can frame the concept in Hohfeldian terms. The merits of a claim ask whether the legal rule under which the plaintiff sues
establishes a right in her and imposes a duty on the defendant, and
whether the defendant’s conduct was inconsistent with that duty, vio47
A
lating the plaintiff’s rights and entitling her to some remedy.
plaintiff prevails if she can show a violation of a right-duty combination on the facts at issue.
Ultimately, all four framings get at the same idea: merits turn on
whether an enforceable legal rule exists as law that protects the
plaintiff; controls the defendant; regulates the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence at issue; and renders the defendant liable to the plaintiff for some remedy.
A. The Many Faces of Jurisdiction
The conception of church and state as competing, coexisting sovereigns has long been framed in jurisdictional terms. John Calvin
spoke of two sovereigns, one religious and one civil, given “the not in48
appropriate names of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction.” In A Letter
Concerning Toleration, John Locke similarly spoke of matters belonging
to the church and the worship of God being “removed out of the
49
reach of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.”
The Hosanna-Tabor Court
looked to James Madison for the same idea. As President, in vetoing
a bill that would have incorporated the Protestant Episcopal
Church, Madison emphasized “the essential distinction between
50
civil and religious functions.”
Modern law-and-religion scholars similarly speak of the First
Amendment in power terms, that is, as deriving from churches’ sovereign nature and limiting the state’s authority to secular and temporal

46

See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (describing the theory of legal relations).
47
See id. at 32 (explaining the correlation between rights and duties); see also Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236 (describing Hohfeld’s theory).
48
2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 140 (Henry Beveridge
trans., 1953) (1536); see also Horwitz, Institutions, supra note 5, at 83-84, 107 (describing
theory of “sphere sovereignty”).
49
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans. 1689),
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/tolerati.htm.
50
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W.
4056, 4060 (2012) (quoting 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-83 (1811) (veto statement of
President James Madison)).
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51

52

concerns. The First Amendment thus imposes a “jurisdictional bar”
53
that limits the reach of civil jurisdiction over spiritual matters.
Therein lies the source of the confusion. Jurisdiction, Evan Lee ar54
But there are
gues, means “something like legitimate authority.”
many forms of legitimate authority—or jurisdiction—vested in many
distinct legal bodies and actors. Simply labeling the ministerial exemption as jurisdictional is imprecise; the question is “legitimate au55
thority in whom to do what.”
This sets up two fundamental,
overlapping distinctions that drive the merits/jurisdiction divide generally and the ministerial exemption in particular.
1. Adjudicative Jurisdiction and Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The first distinction is between adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction on
the one hand, and prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction on the other.
Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power of secular rulemakers to prescribe legal rules and to regulate real-world behavior. It can be understood under any of our definitions: as the power to assert regulatory
authority over some actors and to prohibit or regulate some conduct;
as the power to establish Hohfeldian rights and duties; or as the power
56
to determine who can sue whom for what primary conduct.
The
most common wielder of prescriptive jurisdiction is the legislature,
which bears primary responsibility for establishing prospective legal
rules of general applicability to real-world behavior.
The Constitution primarily deals in prescriptive jurisdiction. It
speaks to Congress’s authority to prescribe legal rules, establishing internal limits (e.g., the requirement that regulated conduct affect interstate commerce, or the limits on congressional power under § 5 of the
57
Fourteenth Amendment ) and external limits (e.g., the First Amend51

See e.g., Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 158-59 (citing Michael W. McConnell,
Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 7, 8).
52
Esbeck, supra note 17, at 49; Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 63, 88.
53
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 121 (“[T]he Religion Clauses are primarily
jurisdictional, limiting government to the secular and temporal, and foreclosing government from exercising authority over the spiritual domain.”).
54
Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003).
55
Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 261.
56
See Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 236 (considering jurisdiction
under each framework); supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
57
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (power
to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 607, 609, 619-20 (2000) (discussing limits on Congress’s prescriptive power
under both provisions).
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ment freedom of speech, or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec58
tion ) on that power. These limits operate as what Matthew Adler and
59
Michael Dorf call constitutional “existence conditions.” For a subconstitutional legal rule, such as a statute, to come into existence as
valid and enforceable law, it must satisfy certain constitutional conditions, notably legislative enactment in compliance with these internal
60
and external limits. Any rule that does not satisfy those constitution61
al conditions does not exist as law; it is nonlaw. Most constitutional
provisions (e.g., the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment) function as existence conditions: where a purported subconstitutional rule
conflicts with an internal or external constitutional limit on legislative
power, it never comes into existence as law, and never becomes a valid
62
and enforceable rule regulating real-world conduct. No legal rule
reaches (prohibits) the conduct at issue, and no right/duty combina63
tion ever comes into existence as law.
Constitutional existence conditions limit prescriptive jurisdiction.
They deprive the government of jurisdiction—legitimate authority—to
enact legal rules that are inconsistent with those conditions, and any
legal rule or right/duty combination purportedly created does not
exist as law. This is true both where the legislature enacts a rule that
must be rejected as unconstitutional for exceeding the limits of the
existence condition, and where the legislature, recognizing the constitutional limits on its prescriptive power, declines to enact a legal rule
or enacts a narrower legal rule where a broader rule would exceed
64
constitutional limits.
The key, however, is that nonexistence of a legal rule does not deprive a court of judicial jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim under appropriate law. A claim of right fails because there is no legal rule—

58

U.S. CONST. amend. I; id. amend. XIV; see also Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra
note 40, at 252-55 (describing external limitations the Constitution places on Congress’s legislative power).
59
Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003).
60
See id. at 1120 (“[A] constitutional provision is an existence condition for that
type of law if no proposition can be law of that type unless the provision is satisfied.”).
61
Id.
62
See id. at 1113 (arguing that the First Amendment “can also be understood as setting forth existence conditions for legislation”); id. at 1154 (“All agree (tacitly) that
[the Commerce Clause] states an existence condition.”).
63
See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
64
See Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 244-45, 250-55 (providing examples of both situations).
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and no right/duty combination—to be enforced, which results in the
failure on the merits of any claim brought under that purported rule.
The First Amendment regularly functions as an existence condition
for subconstitutional legal rules and a limit on legislative authority to
65
enact those rules. Consider, for example, Bartnicki v. Vopper. The
Court held that an individual could not be liable for damages under
federal wiretap statutes for disseminating an unlawfully intercepted
telephone conversation where the defendant was not involved in the
66
interception. The First Amendment broadly protected dissemination
of truthful, lawfully obtained information on a matter of public concern, and vested defendants with a constitutional liberty to publish
67
such information free from legal constraint. The statute prohibiting
the defendant’s conduct thus did not exist as law because it failed to
satisfy the First Amendment existence condition. The wiretap statute
exceeded constitutional limits on Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction
68
and thus could not reach the defendant or his conduct.
Similarly, the entire regime of First Amendment defamation law es69
tablished in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny imposes an
existence condition on state defamation law. No existing legal rule
allows a public figure to recover for defamation absent a showing of
70
actual malice proven by clear and convincing evidence. Stated differently, a subconstitutional legal rule without those protections exceeds the prescriptive jurisdiction of the institution charged with
establishing defamation rules; such a rule cannot exist as law given
First Amendment requirements. Defamation is perhaps unique in that,
as a common law legal rule, courts—rather than legislatures—exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction. But that distinction is immaterial; the point is
that the First Amendment imposes a limit on the authority to prescribe
71
substantive legal rules, regardless of who may exercise that power.
The ministerial exemption should be understood in similar terms,
given that cases arise in an identical procedural posture—the First
Amendment provides a defense in a civil action brought under a sub65

532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Id. at 518.
67
Id. at 525, 527-28.
68
Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 253-54.
69
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70
Id. at 285-86.
71
Many of the foundational church autonomy cases involved property disputes
grounded in state common law. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976); see also Horwitz, Institutions, supra note 5, at 116 (discussing early
church property disputes).
66
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constitutional rule. The ministerial exemption limits the right/duty
combinations that Congress can create between religious organizations and their ministerial employees, as well as the conduct that Congress, exercising its prescriptive jurisdiction, can prohibit in that
relationship. In other words, it is accurate to say that the First
Amendment erects a “jurisdictional bar,” so long as we understand
that the jurisdiction barred is Congress’s prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating some real-world conduct.
Closely related to prescriptive jurisdiction is enforcement jurisdiction—the power of the executive or an executive-branch agency to
enforce legislatively enacted legal rules. In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, the Supreme Court considered whether the NLRB, the agency
charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
possessed statutory authority to order the Catholic Diocese to recognize and bargain with a union representing lay teachers in diocesan
72
schools. The Court held that the Board lacked such power, at least
73
absent a “clear expression of Congress’ intent” to confer that authority,
given that Board enforcement would “‘almost necessarily’” create First
74
Amendment problems in that situation.
The Catholic Bishop Court spoke in jurisdictional terms, albeit inconsistently. At times, it framed the issue as whether teachers at
75
church-operated schools are “covered by the Act,” which sounds in
the merits realm of the reach of the statute. At other times, the Court
framed the issue as whether teachers in church-operated schools were
76
brought “within the jurisdiction of the Board.” The problem, even
77
then, was the Court’s less-than-meticulous use of key terms. Asking
whether the Board has jurisdiction really asks whether the executive
has the authority to enforce the NLRA against the actors and conduct
at issue. This, in turn, depends on (1) whether the Board is, in fact,
78
the agency vested with enforcement authority, and (2) whether the
72

440 U.S. 490, 491 (1979).
Id. at 507.
74
Id. at 496 (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977)).
75
Id. at 504.
76
Id. at 507.
77
See supra text accompanying note 37.
78
Take an admittedly simple example. Imagine a person given a traffic ticket by
the police of Municipality A when his car was parked illegally in Municipality B. The
ticket would be invalid and the prosecution would fail—not because any court was
without jurisdiction and not because Municipality A lacked the authority to regulate
parking, but because the police in Municipality A lacked enforcement authority under
the parking laws of Municipality B.
73
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substantive provisions of the Act reach the actors and events at issue.
The latter question turns on the scope of the prescriptive jurisdiction
that Congress could or did exercise in enacting the law in the first
place. In other words, it asks whether the Catholic Church can be
regulated under the terms of the NLRA, regardless of who the enforcing body or entity is.
The relevant executive enforcement agency for employment discrimination law is the EEOC, which possesses statutory authority to
investigate and bring civil actions against violators of federal employ79
ment discrimination laws. Like the NLRB, the EEOC’s enforcement
power depends on the existence of conduct subject to the reach of the
underlying statute. Thus, the agency’s power to institute an action is, in
one respect, coextensive with that of a private plaintiff: both depend on
the merits issue of the existence of enforceable substantive law violated
by real-world conduct. Absent existing law that reaches and regulates
the conduct at issue, there is nothing for the EEOC to enforce. As in
Catholic Bishop, the First Amendment’s religion clauses affect the statute’s reach and, therefore, the EEOC’s enforcement authority.
Prescriptive jurisdiction, and its corresponding enforcement jurisdiction, contrasts with adjudicative jurisdiction. The latter is a court’s
root power to adjudicate—to hear and resolve legal and factual issues
under substantive legal rules, and to provide the adjudicative and remedial forum to resolve claims of right. Adjudicative jurisdiction has
nothing to do with the ultimate success of a claim on its merits, but
rather focuses solely on whether the court has the power to provide a
forum for considering and resolving the legal and factual disputes un80
der those rules in either direction.
Failure to distinguish prescriptive jurisdiction from adjudicative jurisdiction is the fundamental flaw in the adjudicative jurisdiction approach to the ministerial exemption. Greg Kalscheur and others
frequently emphasize the jurisdictional referent in church autonomy
and in the religion clauses, speaking of limits on “federal jurisdiction”

79

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (granting the EEOC authority to investigate
and initiate civil actions to enforce Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (cross-referencing
§ 2000e and granting the EEOC the same authority to enforce the ADA). The EEOC
initiated the civil action in Hosanna-Tabor, and the former employee, Cheryl Perich,
intervened. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80
U.S.L.W. 4056, 4058 (2012).
80
Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 948; Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra note 40, at 261.
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or “civil jurisdiction” or of constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of
81
civil or secular government and authority.
Again, however, a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a case under existing substantive law is different from Congress’s jurisdiction to bring
that substantive law into existence in the first place. The ministerial
exemption is indeed a constitutional bar on civil jurisdiction. But the
bar is not on the court’s civil jurisdiction to decide the case before it,
but on Congress’s civil jurisdiction to enact legal rules regulating
churches’ conduct toward ministerial employees. The nonexistence of
an enforceable legal rule means the statutory claim to enforce that
rule fails—on the merits.
2. Adjudicative Disabilities and Regulatory Disabilities
The difference between types of jurisdiction maps onto a second distinction—between adjudicative disabilities and regulatory disabilities.
An adjudicative disability means courts are disabled from adjudicating—
from hearing and resolving the legal and factual issues presented—
because of an absence of adjudicative jurisdiction. A regulatory disability means government institutions, especially legislatures, are disabled
from enacting legal rules that regulate particular real-world conduct
and actors, and it arises from an absence of prescriptive jurisdiction.
Scholars routinely speak of the religion clauses as imposing an ad82
judicative disability or a limit on judicial competence. Courts must
83
avoid deciding, or even inquiring into, ecclesiastical matters. To be
sure, there is an adjudicative disability at work with the ministerial exemption. A court will be unable to conclude that a ministerial employee suffered discrimination. It cannot enter a judgment in favor of
a ministerial employee plaintiff or grant her a remedy or relief for the
harm she suffered; it can do nothing but reject a ministerial employee’s
claims. That disability preserves the necessary area of church authority
over spiritual matters and avoids secular entanglement in those issues.

81

See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 81-85, 91-95; supra note 35; see also Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing First Amendment
limits in jurisdictional terms).
82
See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 6 (describing First Amendment–imposed limits on
judicial “competence”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 122 (“[T]he Constitution
disables civil courts from resolving certain classes of questions. This is an adjudicative disability . . . .”).
83
See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Blocking
such inquiries—such entanglements of the secular courts in religious affairs—is one of
the grounds on which the ministers exception was devised . . . .”).
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But the limitation on judicial decisionmaking is incidental to the
broader limitation on legislative power and on the reach and scope of
the substantive law Congress can enact. The First Amendment disables all secular law and all secular institutions from regulating the
church’s actions on matters of faith, structure, and membership, plac84
ing these matters entirely beyond the authority of the state. The judiciary is implicated only because that is the forum in which secular
legal rules are enforced. But the judicial limitation arises not from an
absence of core adjudicative power, but from an absence of existing
legal rules to be applied and enforced, which in turn arises from an
absence of prescriptive authority to enact those rules. The problem, in
other words, is not that courts are barred from evaluating a priest’s job
performance or from ordering his reinstatement; it is that secular
lawmaking institutions are barred from enacting rules that provide a
legal basis for evaluation or reinstatement.
Thomas Berg captured this best in insisting that the ministerial exemption rests fundamentally on substantive nonentanglement—which
frees religious organizations to organize themselves, define their mission, and choose their workers without undue government interfer85
ence—and not merely decisional nonentanglement. The point is not
that the First Amendment should not countenance judicial inquiries
into matters of faith and religious structure; it is that the First
Amendment should not countenance substantive law regulating matters of faith and religious structure, such as who can minister the gos86
87
pel. That is the “realm[] the law is not free to enter.”
As discussed earlier, the First Amendment can impose a regulatory
disability and limit prescriptive jurisdiction in either of two ways—by
causing Congress to legislate narrowly in light of constitutional con88
cerns or by invalidating any rule Congress did enact. Put another
way, either Congress did not exercise its prescriptive authority to reach
the conduct at issue or Congress exceeded that authority by attempting to regulate that conduct. Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, circuits adopting
the merits view of the ministerial exemption had divided over how ex84

See Lund, supra note 2, at 35 (describing areas with which the “government
should be flatly barred from interfering”).
85
Berg, supra note 14, at 1612-13; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 14, at 120 (arguing for a focus on Congress’s “regulatory capacity”).
86
See Esbeck, supra note 17, at 44 (describing the “sphere” within which “churches
may operate free of civil constraints”); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056, 4061 (2012).
87
Horwitz, Act III, supra note 5, at 162.
88
See supra text accompanying note 64.
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actly it operated. Some treated it as a First Amendment affirmative
89
defense to the claim. Others interpreted the applicable federal statute narrowly in light of First Amendment problems (as in Catholic Bishop) and read the limitation into the statute itself; Congress was
deemed not to have asserted regulatory authority or to have reached
90
the church/minister relations in its statutory enactment.
Hosanna-Tabor clearly resolved this point, holding the ministerial
exemption to be constitutionally grounded in both religion clauses
and to work as an affirmative defense that defeats the statutory dis91
crimination claim. In other words, the First Amendment stripped
Congress of its authority to regulate the employment relationship
between churches and ministers, rendering the ADA unconstitutional in the case at hand.
While it is helpful that the Hosanna-Tabor Court took a firm stance
on how the prescriptive limitation functions, it made no difference to
the broader conclusion that the exemption derives from a prescriptive
limitation and is thus a merits doctrine. Under the Court’s position,
Congress exercised its regulatory jurisdiction, but the statute exceeded
that jurisdiction by attempting to control the employment relationship
between the church and its ministerial employees in a way inconsistent
with the First Amendment. Under the alternative approach, Congress
would be deemed to have declined to exercise regulatory jurisdiction
that it lacked in any event, likely recognizing the First Amendment–
imposed limits on its legislative authority. The end point is always that
no legal rule exists as law protecting the minister plaintiff, regulating
the church defendant, or imposing liability on the church defendant
for its employment decisions as to the ministerial employee. And the
claim brought to enforce that nonexistent rule must fail.
B. Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exemption
With these two distinctions in mind, Hosanna-Tabor becomes an
easy case on the jurisdictionality issue.
92
Cheryl Perich was a teacher at a Lutheran-affiliated school. She
began as a lay teacher and became a called teacher one year later, hav-

89

See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006).
90
See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972).
91
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4063 n.4.
92
Id. at 4057-58.
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93

ing completed colloquy classes on the Christian faith. With her call,
she received a certificate of admission into the teaching ministry and
94
received the title of “commissioned minister.” Her teaching duties
remained the same before and after receiving her call; she taught a
range of secular subjects in kindergarten and fourth grades, while also
95
leading religious observance and instruction. The school sought to
provide a “Christ-centered education” that incorporated God and reli96
gion into all its subjects.
Perich took several months off while suffering from narcolepsy; the
97
school objected when she sought to return to her teaching duties. A
dispute followed, which ultimately resulted in the school offering
Perich a peaceful release from her duties, which meant resigning her
98
call; Perich refusing; and the church rescinding the call. The church
viewed her insubordination and threats to sue as violations of Luther99
an doctrines requiring internal resolution of all religious disputes.
After Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC filed a civil ac100
tion against the church, and Perich intervened as a plaintiff.
There should be no question that there was a statutory basis for
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. The claim was one
under the ADA, a federal statute; it therefore was a civil action “arising
101
The district court also could
under” the laws of the United States.
102
adjudicate the case as a civil action “brought under” the ADA. Given
these statutory grants of authority, the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction. Whether the plaintiff’s claim ultimately succeeds or fails
must be beside the adjudicative jurisdictional point.
The real question was the breadth of the ministerial exemption,
but the Supreme Court identified a broad constitutional exception
103
that barred Perich’s ADA claims.
In other words, the First Amendment imposed a regulatory disability on Congress, depriving it of pre-

93

Id. at 4058.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 4057.
97
Id. at 4058.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see also Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra note 40,
at 695-96 (offering definitions of “arising under”).
102
42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(f)(3).
103
Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4061-63.
94
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scriptive authority to enact the ADA and to regulate a church-affiliated
school in its employment relationship with the minister-plaintiff.
We can explain this conclusion through any conception of merits.
We could say that the ADA does not—and cannot, in light of the First
Amendment—reach the church-operated school’s conduct toward
Perich; this, the Morrison Court told us, is the same as saying that the
ADA does not, and cannot, prohibit the church’s conduct as to this
employee. Or we could say that Congress did not, and could not, assert regulatory authority over the church school as to its employment
relationships with a commissioned minister such as Perich. Or, in
Hohfeldian terms, no right-duty correlative was breached. Perich, as a
commissioned minister, had no secular right not to be fired by the
church for reasons related to her functions, and Hosanna-Tabor had
no secular duty not to fire her for such reasons. Or we could say that
Perich, or the EEOC on her behalf, could not sue the church for its
employment decisions seeking reinstatement or back pay because she
was a ministerial employee.
The point is that no statutory rule exists as law subjecting the
church-operated school for this employment decision affecting this
employee. The EEOC and Perich’s civil action to enforce such a nonexistent rule fails, a failure on the merits under any of our definitions.
On the other hand, had the Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the
ministerial exemption did not apply on the facts at hand—because, for
example, Perich was not a minister—application of the ADA would
have been constitutional. And we could frame it as the converse of the
merits definitions: the ADA does, and can, reach the church and prohibit it from firing Perich because of her disability; Congress did, and
could, assert regulatory authority over a church-operated school as to
this employment relationship; Perich does have a secular right not to
be fired for her disability, the church does have a secular duty not to
do so, and that right/duty correlative was breached on the facts at
hand. Perich could sue the church for its employment decision, and
she would be entitled to a remedy for its violation of the statute.
We then would move to the central statutory inquiry of whether the
church violated the ADA in firing Perich. If it did, then the EEOC and
Perich would have won on the merits.
II. CHARACTERIZATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
Jurisdictionality was not formally in play in Hosanna-Tabor. The
Court did not grant certiorari on it. The issue did not arise during
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oral argument, although at one point the Solicitor General described
the exemption as “a question of the realm of permissible governmen104
tal regulation,” language sounding in substantive merits. One amicus supporting the church argued the subject matter jurisdiction un105
understanding, although using much of the reasoning and analysis
criticized in Part I of this Essay.
Nevertheless, it is neither surprising nor unwelcome that the Court
reached out to resolve the issue, even if only in a conclusory fashion.
As noted earlier, this analysis was consistent with the Roberts
Court’s jurisdictional project of eliminating “drive-by jurisdictional
rulings,” decisions in which a legal rule is treated as jurisdictional only
through “unrefined” and “less-than meticulous” analysis and labels,
without rigorous consideration of the meaning or consequences of
106
those labels. The Court in the last decade has decided several jurisdictionality cases, explicitly holding in all but one that the provision at
107
issue was not jurisdictional. In particular, the Court has twice adopted a merits interpretation of a federal claim–creating statute in the
face of a circuit split over whether limits on the scope and reach of the
statute defeated claims on the merits or deprived courts of jurisdic108
tion. The Court thus was seizing another easy opportunity to resolve
a circuit split on jurisdictionality. Indeed, several Justices—including
the Chief Justice, the author of Hosanna-Tabor—seem to have an interest in procedural issues, so the desire to resolve the issue, even in a
109
case in which it was not squarely presented, was somewhat expected.
104

Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (No. 100553), 2011 WL 4593953, at *39.
105
Brief for WallBuilders, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28-34,
Hosanna Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. 4056 (No. 10-0553), 2011 WL 2581850, at*28-34.
106
See supra text accompanying note 37.
107
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 80 U.S.L.W. 4045, 4048 (2012) (holding that the
statute relating to required content in a Certificate of Appealability for habeas petitioners is nonjurisdictional); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877
(2010) (holding that the extraterritorial reach of federal law is a merits question); Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (holding that the requirement
of copyright registration is a nonjurisdictional precondition to suit); Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding that the definition of employer under Title
VII is a merits issue). But see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206-07 (2007) (“We have
long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature.”). In a second case, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 132 (2008), the Court held that the statute of limitations on claims against the
United States in the Court of Federal Claims is not waivable or forfeitable and can be
raised at any time, although the Court did not explicitly label it jurisdictional.
108
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877; Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511, 516.
109
Wasserman, Revival, supra note 37, at 312.
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Morrison provided the model for what the Court did here. The
Court had granted certiorari to consider the extraterritorial application of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to misconduct
by foreign defendant corporations that harmed foreign plaintiffs in
110
foreign-exchange securities transactions. Lower courts were inexpli111
cably divided over whether extraterritoriality was jurisdictional, although the Court did not expressly take the case for the purpose of
considering or resolving that split. Nevertheless, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia took a brief detour to insist that extraterritoriality was a merits question going to the statute’s reach, properly
resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, rather than a jurisdictional ques112
tion resolvable on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. The Court then continued to the central question, holding that the statute did not have
extraterritorial application and thus did not reach or regulate the
113
conduct and actors at issue.
Hosanna-Tabor invited similar treatment. As in Morrison, the lower
court had adopted an adjudicative jurisdiction characterization, which
the parties did not contest, but which was plainly erroneous on a more
precise and refined understanding of the merits/jurisdiction divide.
And, as in Morrison, the issue had divided the courts of appeals.
Moreover, the circuit split on the ministerial exemption ran along
multiple, confusing lines, demanding Supreme Court involvement. As
discussed earlier, some lower courts treated it as a question of the
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction; other circuits treated it as a
merits issue; others had not taken an explicit position; and one cir114
cuit actually had contradictory panel decisions.
Given this incoherence among lower courts, the issue was ripe for Supreme Court
resolution, and a wise exercise of supervisory power justified the
Court addressing it in this context.
It should not be surprising that the Court so easily dispatched with
the issue. The Court appears to be arriving at the view that jurisdiction/merits cases are fairly straightforward. It is easy to recognize
when an issue relates to what the statute prohibits or to who can sue
whom for what conduct. There is no longer a need to grant certiorari
or brief this specific issue because that merits characterization is simply
110

130 S. Ct. at 2875-76.
See id. at 2877.
112
Id.; see also id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that,
because the statute did not apply extraterritorially, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim).
113
Id. at 2883.
114
See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
111
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obvious. Instead, it can be handled in a few sentences, even in a footnote, in the course of resolving the real substance of the claim, such as
whether Perich was a minister.
The quick resolution also might suggest that the Court is adopting
a more absolute approach to what constitutes a merits issue, an ap115
proach I previously urged. The Court has granted certiorari specifically to resolve a jurisdiction/merits dispute in only one recent case—
116
Arbaugh involved Title VII’s definition of
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.
“employer” as an entity having fifteen or more employees, with a unanimous court characterizing this as a substantive element of a claim and
117
not as a limit on the court’s adjudicative jurisdiction.
The key, the
Court said, was whether Congress ranks a statutory limitation as jurisdictional through a clear statement; if Congress did not, as with Title
118
VII, then the issue is nonjurisdictional.
Arbaugh’s plain statement
119
rule in jurisdiction/merits cases unfortunately leaves Congress free
to conflate merits and jurisdiction, and define all manner of substan120
tive issues as going to judicial jurisdiction.
Yet in neither Hosanna-Tabor nor Morrison did the Court cite Arbaugh or look for congressional statements or intent as to characterization. In both, the Court characterized limitations on the scope
and reach of the legal rule as merits-based simply because what a legal rule prohibits and who it controls is, by its nature, a merits is121
sue.
Congressional intent was irrelevant to the categorical
conception of what are merits issues.
Ironically, in deciding jurisdictionality issues in an unreasoned
and unexplained footnote without the benefit of briefing, the Ho-

115

Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 953.
546 U.S. 500 (2006).
117
Id. at 515-16.
118
Id. at 514-16.
119
This contrasts with issues dividing jurisdiction and procedure, which represent a
more complicated divide and in which Arbaugh’s plain statement approach does work.
See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 959 (“[T]he line between adjudicative jurisdiction and pure procedure is notoriously soft and confusing in practice . . . .”); id. at
960 (arguing that Arbaugh works in drawing the line between jurisdiction and procedure); see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 80 U.S.L.W. 4045, 4048 (2012) (holding that the
statute relating to required content in a Certificate of Appealability for habeas petitioners is nonjurisdictional); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010)
(holding that the requirement of copyright registration is nonjurisdictional).
120
See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 953.
121
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W.
4056, 4063 n.4 (2012); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
116
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sanna-Tabor Court essentially delivered a drive-by ruling. The difference is that it got this one right.
The Court also used less-than-meticulous language in discussing jurisdictionality, prompting some continued confusion. The last sentence of
the Court’s footnote on jurisdictionality states, “District courts have power
to consider ADA claims in cases of this sort, and to decide whether the
122
claim can proceed or is instead barred by the ministerial exception.”
The idea of a claim being “barred” is often associated with jurisdiction, although it becomes more complicated when we consider the
123
different types of jurisdiction involved.
Moreover, saying the claim
can “proceed” suggests the ministerial exemption functions as a
threshold to considering the ADA claim, which again sounds like adjudicative jurisdiction. The Court appears to have meant that the ministerial exemption analysis determines the constitutional validity of the
ADA on the facts of the case, and therefore the existence of the ADA
as an enforceable legal rule in this case, which demands First Amendment analysis prior to any statutory analysis. But the threshold analysis
still goes to the ultimate validity of the claim under a purported subconstitutional rule, not to the federal court’s root power to hear the
claim arising under federal law.
III. JURISDICTIONALITY AND PROCEDURAL STRATEGY
We might consider whether churches, religious organizations, and
law-and-religion scholars are satisfied with the full outcome in Hosanna-Tabor. They won a broad ministerial exemption that at least suggested
a wide scope for who is a ministerial employee, a result that has been
124
welcomed by many commentators.

122

Hosanna-Tabor, 80 U.S.L.W. at 4063 n.4.
See supra subsection I.A.1.
124
See, e.g., Marc DeGirolami, The Historical and Particularist Quality of HosannaTabor, MIRROR JUST. ( J an. 11, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
mirrorofjustice/2012/01/the-historical-and-particularist-quality-of-hosanna-tabor.html;
Richard W. Garnett, Hosanna-Tabor Ruling A Win For Religious Freedom, USA TODAY.COM ( J an. 11, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/
story/2012-01-11/hosanna-tabor-church-state-case/52500140/1; Douglas Laycock, My
Take: Huge Win For Religious Liberty at the Supreme Court, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2012, 9:58
AM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/12/my-take-huge-win-for-religious-libertyat-the-supreme-court. But see Mike Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW ( J an. 12,
2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote.html.
123
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But they did not get a jurisdictional characterization of the exemp125
tion, which many religious organizations had been pushing, often to
great lengths. As noted earlier, one amicus supporting the church in Ho126
sanna-Tabor argued the subject matter jurisdiction understanding. The
church itself appeared to accept the lower courts’ jurisdictional characterization, arguing only that the court wrongly applied the exemption.
Perhaps more telling was the 2010 Tenth Circuit decision in
127
The plaintiff was a forSkrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa.
mer lay administrator of a community outreach and education program run by the Catholic Diocese who brought claims for gender and
age discrimination following her termination. The Diocese moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the ministerial
128
exemption.
The district court converted the motion to one to dismiss for failure to state a claim, then converted that to a motion for
summary judgment when the parties presented evidence beyond the
129
pleadings on the exemption issue.
The court then granted summary judgment in favor of the Diocese on ministerial exemption
grounds, agreeing that the plaintiff’s job responsibilities made her a
130
ministerial employee.
The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit,
and the Diocese cross-appealed, urging the court of appeals to convert the order back to a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal. The Tenth Circuit
properly declined to do so, correctly characterizing the ministerial
exemption as a merits issue, before affirming the grant of summary
131
judgment in favor of the Diocese.
Footnote 4 of Hosanna-Tabor quietly ends the debate and makes
clear that future ministerial exemption disputes will be resolved as
merits defenses. But consider the irony of churches’ previous, and
perhaps continued, insistence on the adjudicative jurisdiction view:
religious organizations are better off with the merits characterization.
125

Cf. Michael Moreland, Hosanna-Tabor: Freedom of Religion (Not Merely Association)
and a Note about Defenses, MIRROR JUST. ( J an. 11, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://
mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/01/hosanna-tabor-freedom-ofreligion-not-merely-association-and-a-note-about-defenses.html (arguing that the ministerial exemption is best understood as a subject matter jurisdiction defense, but stating
“I suppose it's a great day for religious freedom when one is left only to nitpick over the
distinction between a jurisdictional bar and a defense on the merits”).
126
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
127
611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010).
128
Id. at 1241.
129
Id. (converting the motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d)).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1242. I have questioned elsewhere whether the cross-appeal was procedurally proper or necessary. See Wasserman, Tenth Circuit, supra note 39.
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A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on ministerial exemption grounds is with
prejudice—it reflects a legal defect in the claim because no law exists
subjecting the defendant to liability or entitling the plaintiff to a
judgment. Both a grant of summary judgment and a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal operate as judgments on the merits having preclusive effect;
the plaintiff will be unable to initiate a new lawsuit based on these facts
or events, and the church would be relieved from its burden of having
to defend any further. On the other hand, a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal is
without prejudice, not on the merits, and not preclusive; the plaintiff
132
could refile the identical discrimination claims in state court.
Had
the Diocese prevailed on its cross-appeal in Skrzypczak, it would have
converted a merits dismissal into a jurisdictional dismissal, opening the
door for the plaintiff to refile her action in state court and forcing the
Diocese to litigate all over again.
Of course, were the plaintiff to refile in state court, the Diocese
would again assert the ministerial exemption as the basis for dismissal,
arguing that the First Amendment stripped state courts of jurisdiction
as well. This argument is problematic in two respects. First, state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction, meaning they have authority
to hear claims purportedly brought under any existing law, regardless
of source. If the case fails in state court, then it must be because of a
problem with the substance of the underlying law. Second, a subsequent adjudicative jurisdiction dismissal in state court leaves the plaintiff entirely without a judicial forum empowered to hear her claim.
Limits on federal adjudicative jurisdiction typically are premised on
the availability of some alternative forum in which to seek relief.
On the other hand, a person should not be entitled to any forum if
no existing law gives her an enforceable right. And this demonstrates
why Hosanna-Tabor’s conclusion as to the exemption’s merits nature
was correct. The First Amendment limits Congress’s authority to regulate church conduct by statute; Congress cannot enact the ADA or Title
VII as an enforceable legal rule against religious institutions as to ministerial employees. A ministerial employee can no more sue for employment discrimination in state court than in federal court.
Religious organizations perhaps have pushed the adjudicative jurisdiction approach in pursuit of other procedural benefits, namely a
quick exit from litigation and avoidance of the burden and expense of
132

See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382 (1985)
(stating that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not preclude later
adjudication in another court); Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, supra note 40, at 666
& n.107 (explaining the nonpreclusive effect of Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals).
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invasive discovery. As a competing sovereign, the argument goes,
churches must have every opportunity to quickly escape the burdens
associated with having to litigate and deal with attendant costs and in133
trusions.
Because subject matter jurisdiction typically is a threshold
issue raised and resolved in the early stages of litigation, a successful
ministerial exemption defense can be resolved at the outset, ending
the litigation without extensive discovery. At the same time, subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, meaning the church
134
cannot waive the exemption and can always go back to assert it.
But these procedural benefits are either illusory or available without
mischaracterizing the exemption. First, the church cannot escape discovery. No matter how the ministerial exemption is characterized, the
court must determine whether it applies in a given case, which means an
inquiry into (1) whether the defendant is a religious organization, and
(2) whether the plaintiff is a ministerial employee, however that is de135
This is a factual inquiry—under the majority’s approach, a
fined.
multifactor, fact-intensive inquiry—which necessarily requires discovery.
136
We label this “jurisdictional discovery,” and it may be limited only to
the plaintiff’s ministerial status and no other issue. But discovery, and
the attendant intrusion on the church and its officials, must be had.
Perhaps religious groups believed that jurisdictional discovery
would be narrower, shorter, and less intrusive, justifying the adjudicative jurisdictional characterization. But churches can achieve identical
procedural benefits even with the exemption as a merits rule. If the
facts in a future case showing the plaintiff's ministerial character appear on the face of the complaint, a church can get early resolution of
the legal issue, without the need for discovery, by filing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Alternatively, a church can file an early summary
133

See Berg et al., supra note 14, at 189 (“[T]he ministerial exception protects
against the burdens of litigation and investigation . . . .”); Kalscheur, supra note 5,
at 89-90 (describing the exemption as reducing the social costs of litigation, akin
to sovereign immunity).
134
See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
135
Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80
U.S.L.W. 4056, 4061-63 (2012) (considering multiple factors that made the plaintiff a
ministerial employee), with id. at 4063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the
key is whether the religious organization sincerely believes the plaintiff is a minister),
and id. at 4064 (Alito, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing for emphasis on the
functional status of the plaintiff); see also Lund, supra note 2, at 71 (arguing for a twofold approach, looking at both job duties and whether the plaintiff holds clerical status
or ecclesiastical office).
136
S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 489, 491 (2010).
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137

judgment motion asserting the ministerial exemption, and then ask
the court to limit discovery only to fact issues going to the exemp138
And a district court likely will agree to limit initial discovery
tion.
139
where, as here, substantial First Amendment interests are implicated.
Second, it is important not to confuse true adjudicative jurisdiction
rules from the procedural incidents of those rules, such as nonwai140
Many merits-based legal doctrines rest
vability or early resolution.
on similar policies of getting defendants out of litigation quickly and
relieving them of the burdens of litigation. For example, governmentofficial immunities in constitutional litigation are treated as defenses
against suit and justified as protecting government officials from the
costs, distractions, and burdens of litigation, which means they must
141
have a chance at early exit from the case. But that immunity is never
treated as a limit on adjudicative jurisdiction.
Similarly, nonjurisdictional doctrines can be accorded procedural
incidents of jurisdiction, such as nonwaivability, where the policy goals
142
and values underlying that doctrine demand it. Thus, the ministerial exemption could still be nonwaivable, even as a merits defense, if
the policies underlying church sovereignty and church autonomy demand this additional procedural protection. The Hosanna-Tabor Court
did not consider the waivability of the exemption and the problem has
not arisen in prior cases, although perhaps this an issue for future cases.
The best explanation for insistence on adjudicative jurisdiction arguments is symbolism—the symbolic meaning of winning on jurisdictional grounds. As Greg Kalscheur argues, when federal and state
“courts clearly and consistently treat the ministerial exception as a limitation on the subject matter jurisdiction of the civil courts, they make
a powerful statement about the foundations of limited government:

137

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b) (“[A] party may file a motion for summary judgment at
any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery.”).
138
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (listing factors for courts to consider in limiting
the frequency or extent of discovery).
139
See, e.g., Lipinski v. Skinner, 781 F. Supp. 131, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering
First Amendment concerns in determining the scope of discovery).
140
See Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 83-85, 90 n.331 (noting procedural concerns affecting the ministerial exemption).
141
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32 (2009) (stating that qualified immunity is immunity from suit and should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation).
142
See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 963-64; see also Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that nonjurisdictional rules can possess jurisdictional traits).
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Such statements affirm the penultimacy of the state.”
A jurisdic144
tional win is perceived as an “uber-victory,” a uniquely profound and
powerful litigation win. It suggests that the church is so powerful or so
protected as a competing sovereign as to be beyond the court’s authority. This symbolism trumps the procedural benefits that come with the
merits characterization.
But religious institutions remain special even if the ministerial exemption provides a merits victory. The Hosanna-Tabor Court insisted
that the First Amendment “gives special solicitude to the rights of reli145
gious organizations.”
It is, or should be, an equally powerful statement on the penultimacy of the state that the church lies beyond
Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction. The religion clauses function just
as much as a structural protection for religion when they bar Congress’s exercise of its prescriptive regulatory authority and place religious organizations beyond the reach of secular law. The church’s
status as a special competing and predominant sovereign is doing just
as much work in placing church personnel and organizational decisions beyond congressional regulation. The broader symbolic point—
that the church enjoys unique constitutional immunity from the state’s
sovereign reach on some issues—remains. And that symbolic point
can be made without logical, theoretical, and doctrinal incoherence.
CONCLUSION
The only thing lost in the Court’s quick and unexplained resolution of the jurisdictionality issue is the chance to guide lower courts.
The ministerial exemption is unquestionably now a constitutional affirmative defense to a statutory employment discrimination claim.
There is less certainty as to how lower courts understand the fundamental difference between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction
and how that, in turn, affects future jurisdictionality determinations.
As I have argued elsewhere, clearing up confusion over jurisdictionality and its analytical components has become a major part of the
146
Roberts Court’s jurisprudential agenda.
Hosanna-Tabor provided an
opportunity to add to that agenda, and the Court took it, correctly la-

143

Kalscheur, supra note 5, at 51.
Thanks to Lumen Mulligan for suggesting this phrase.
145
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 80 U.S.L.W.
4056, 4061 (2012).
146
See Wasserman, Drive-by, supra note 37, at 947-48.
144
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beling the ministerial exemption as a merits issue that has nothing to
do with a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction.
Some analysis and explanation in support of its conclusion perhaps
was warranted, however, both for justifying resolution of the circuit
split over the ministerial exemption and for guiding lower courts in
future cases on other jurisdictionality issues that similarly turn on the
line between prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction. This Essay, I
hope, provides the missing analysis. It offers the normative basis for
courts to define the line between jurisdiction and merits. And it
demonstrates that true limits on adjudicative jurisdiction are relatively
few and that most of the limits that come before the courts go to the
merits of the federal claim and must be treated as such.
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